The Developing Mind: A Philosophical Introduction
Butterfill, Stephen A. (2020). The Developing Mind: A Philosophical Introduction. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203758274
Contents
Preface xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 TwoBreakthroughs....................... 2
1.2 Knowledge............................ 3
1.3 A Crude Picture of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 CoreKnowledge......................... 5
1.5 TwoStories............................ 7
1.6 Development Is Rediscovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
I Physical Objects 11
2 Principles of Object Perception 13
2.1 Knowledge of Objects Involves Three Abilities . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Segmentation .......................... 15
2.3 Principles of Object Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Conclusion............................ 23
3�e Simple View 25
3.1 TheSimpleView......................... 25
3.2 Persistence............................ 27
3.3 Extending the Simple View to Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Causal Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 The Case for the Simple View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4�e Linking Problem 41
4.1 Against the Simple View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 Further Evidence Against the Simple View . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3 Things Get Even Worse for the Simple View . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4 The Linking Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.5 Representation Not Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.6 Graded Representations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
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4.7 Conclusion............................ 55
5 Core Knowledge 57
5.1 What Is Core Knowledge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.2 Can Core Knowledge Solve the Linking Problem? . . . . . . 60
5.3 How Not to DeneSomething................. 62
5.4 Will Invoking Modularity Help? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.5 Conclusion............................ 64
6 Object Indexes and Motor Representations of Objects 67
6.1 Object Indexes in Adult Humans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.2 Object Indexes and the Principles of Object Perception . . . 70
6.3 The CLSTX Conjecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.4 SignatureLimits......................... 75
6.5 Knowledge or Core Knowledge or …? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.6 Against the CLSTX Conjecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.7 Motor Representations of Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.8 ConjectureO........................... 83
6.9 Conclusion: Paradox Lost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7 Metacognitive Feelings 89
7.1 Objection to Conjecture O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.2 Metacognitive Feelings: A First Example . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.3 More Metacognitive Feelings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.4 What Is a Metacognitive Feeling? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.5 A Metacognitive Feeling of Surprise? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.6 Conjecture Om.......................... 97
7.7 Metacognitive Feelings are Intentional Isolators . . . . . . . 99
7.8 Conclusion............................ 101
8 Conclusion to Part I 103
8.1 What Is an Expectation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.2 Core Knowledge: A Lighter Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
8.3 Development Is Rediscovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
8.4 How Does Rediscovery Occur? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
9 Innateness 113
9.1 Syntax .............................. 114
9.2 A Poverty of Stimulus Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
9.3 The Poverty of Poverty of Stimulus Arguments . . . . . . . . 118
9.4 Is Core Knowledge Innate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
9.5 Syntax and Rediscovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
9.6 Conclusion............................ 122
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Interlude on Innateness 113
II Minds and Actions 125
10 Action 127
10.1 Tracking vs Knowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
10.2 Three-month-olds Track the Goals of Actions . . . . . . . . 128
10.3 Pure Goal Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
10.4 The Teleological Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.5 Statistical Regularities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
10.6 A Methodological Explanation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
10.7 A Second Puzzle: Acting and Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
10.8 Conclusion............................ 145
11 A �eory of Goal Tracking 147
11.1 TheSimpleView......................... 147
11.2 The Motor Theory of Goal Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
11.3 The Motor Theory and the Teleological Stance . . . . . . . . 151
11.4 TargetvsGoal.......................... 153
11.5 A Dual Process Theory of Goal Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . 155
11.6 PuzzlesSolved? ......................... 157
11.7 Conclusion............................ 158
12 Mind: the Puzzle 161
12.1 AllAboutMaxi ......................... 162
12.2 Infants track false beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
12.3 A Replication Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
12.4 Methodological Defects or Truly Contradictory Responses? . 170
12.5 Models .............................. 173
12.6 The Mindreading Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
13 �ree Levels of Analysis 177
13.1 Tracking Beliefs without Representing Them? . . . . . . . . 177
13.2 Altercentric Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
13.3 Mirroring beliefs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
13.4 Three Levels of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
13.5 TaskAnalysis .......................... 184
13.6 Selection and Inhibition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
13.7 Too Much Mindreading? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
13.8 WhatNow? ........................... 197
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14 Mind: a Solution? 199
14.1 Mindreading Is Sometimes Automatic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
14.2 Mindreading Is Not Always Automatic . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
14.3 A Dual Process Theory of Mindreading . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
14.4 Speed–Accuracy Trade-Os .................. 204
14.5 What Is a Model of Minds and Actions? . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
14.6 Minimal Models of the Mental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
14.7 Signature Limits in Mindreading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
14.8 A Developmental Theory of Mindreading . . . . . . . . . . . 213
14.9 How to Solve the Mindreading Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
14.10 Task Analysis Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
14.11 Is There Core Knowledge of Minds? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
14.12 Origins of Knowledge of Mind: Rediscovery . . . . . . . . . 219
15 Joint Action 223
15.1 Joint Action vs Parallel but Merely Individual Actions . . . . 224
15.2 SharedIntention......................... 226
15.3 Bratman on Shared Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
15.4 An Inconsistent Triad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
15.5 Coordinating Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
15.6 Joint Action in the First Years of Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
15.7 Collective Goals vs Shared Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
15.8 Expectations about Collective Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
15.9 Conclusion............................ 245
16 Conclusion to Part II 249
16.1 Dual Process Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
16.2 Pluralism about Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
16.3 Goal Tracking Is the Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
16.4 When Joint Action Enables Goal Tracking . . . . . . . . . . 253
16.5 Joint Action and the Developmental Emergence of Knowledge 255
Conclusion 259
17 Conclusion 259
17.1 Infants Rely on Minimal Models … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
17.2 … As Do Adults, Sometimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
17.3 PuzzlesMatter.......................... 262
17.4 Linking Problems Abound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
17.5 Core Knowledge Isn’t What You Think It Is . . . . . . . . . . 264
17.6 How to Solve Linking Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
17.7 Representation: Handle with Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
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17.8 Inferential and Intentional Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
17.9 Rediscovery Is Joint Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Glossary 271
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