Joint Action and the Emergence of Mindreading
by Stephen A. Butterfill • Summer 2011-2 • Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick
Abstract
How can we explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of mindreading? Some conjecture that its emergence involves joint action (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Moll & Tomasello, 2007). Reflection on objections to this conjecture reveals mistakes in leading philosophical accounts of both mindreading and joint action. These lectures aim to identify the mistakes and provide fixes. The fixes involve two steps: the construction of a minimal theory of mind; and an account of the distinct roles for shared intention and social motor representation in explaining what joint action is.
Lectures
- 01 Joint Action and Mindreading: Some Problems
- 02 Minimal Theory of Mind
- 02b What Are Modules and What Is Their Role in Development?
- 03 Which Joint Actions Ground Social Cognition?
- 04 Intention and Motor Representation in Joint Action
- 05 Interacting Mindreaders