Joint Action and the Emergence of Mindreading Which Joint Actions Ground Social Cognition? s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk

Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of mindreading.

CONJECTION The existence of abilities to engage in joint action partially explains how sophisticated

forms of mindreading emerge in evolution or development (or both)

Challenge Explain the emergence, in evolution or

development, of sophisticated forms of mindreading.

The existence of abilities to engage in joint action partially explains how sophisticated forms of mindreading emerge in evolution or development (or both)

2nd objection Joint action presupposes sophisticated mindreading

shared intention (or 'collective')

(Gilbert 2006, p. 5)

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'the key property of joint action lies in its internal component [...] in the participants' having a "collective" or "shared" intention.'

(Alonso 2009, pp. 444-5)

'Shared intentionality is the foundation upon which joint action is built.'

(Carpenter 2009, p. 381)

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Jack and Sue walk together

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Jack and Sue walk alongside each other (Gilbert 1990)

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
We collectively perform a dance by running to a shelter at the same time


Not joint


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
We each individually run to a shelter at the same time (in response to a sudden shower).

(Searle 1990, 92)











Functional characterisation

Substantial account



Functional characterisation

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining Substantial account



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shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining



Substantial account

We have a shared intention that we J if

"1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

"2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of Ia, Ib, and meshing subplans of Ia and Ib; you intend [likewise] ...

"3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us" (Bratman 1993:View 4)

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Intentions about intentions

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'shared intentional agency consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning agency of the participants.'

(Bratman 2011, p. 11)

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2. Shared intention requires sophisticated theory of mind cognition.

Therefore:


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
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
Therefore:

Do all joint actions involve shared intentions? No.



(Zhang and Rosenbaum 2007)





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
step back : what is joint action?


tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005) cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007) pretending to row a boat together


painting a house together (Bratman 1992) lifting a heavy sofa together (Velleman 1997) preparing a hollandaise sauce together (Searle 1990) going to Chicago together (Kutz 2000) walking together (Gilbert 1990)

tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005) cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007) pretending to row a boat together

Joint action: an action with two or more agents (Ludwig 2007)








'our primitive actions, the ones we do not by doing something else, ... these are all the actions there are.' (Davidson 1971, p. 59). tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005)


cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006)


bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together

(Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together









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an action with two or more agents (Ludwig 2007)

²Bodily movements 'are all the actions there are' (Davidson 1971, p. 59)

³In supposedly paradigm cases of joint action, there are no bodily movements with more than one agent.

Therefore:

⁴Supposedly paradigm cases are not joint actions.

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Grounding events $D_1, \dots D_n$ ground E, if:

D₁,...D_n and E occur;

 $D_1, ..., D_n$ are each (perhaps improper) parts of E; and every event that is a proper part of E but does not overlap $D_1, ..., D_n$ is caused by some or all of $D_1, ..., D_n$.

(Adapted from Pietroski 1998)

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
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Agency

For an individual to be among the agents of an event is for there to be actions $a_1, \dots a_n$ which ground this event where the individual is an agent of one or more of these actions.

(Adapted from Pietroski 1998)




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


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
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
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



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
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
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




Detour Goals are not intentions


What is the relation between an action and the goal (or goals) to which it is directed?







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





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End Detour



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Not joint

Jack and Sue walk alongside each other (Gilbert 1990)

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
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We each individually run to a shelter at the same time (in response to a sudden shower).

(Searle 1990, 92)



<u>G is a distributive goal</u>: it is an outcome to which each agent's actions are individually directed and it is possible that: all actions succeed relative to this outcome.

G is a collective goal

(a) it is a distributive goal;

(b) the actions are coordinated; and

"It ... seems useful to draw a distinction between elementary or thin forms of joint action common to humans and other social mammals and sophisticated or thick forms of joint action, perhaps unique to the human species."


(Pacherie & Dokic 2006, 110)


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
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
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
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G is a collective goal

(a) it is a distributive goal;

(b) the actions are coordinated; and

(c) coordination of this type would normally facilitate occurrences of outcomes of this type. Each agent most wants and expects each of the other agents to perform activities directed to the goal.

Each agent most wants and expects the goal to occur as a common effect of all their goal-directed actions.

Challenge Explain the emergence, in evolution or

development, of sophisticated forms of mindreading.

The existence of abilities to engage in joint action partially explains how sophisticated forms of mindreading emerge in evolution or development (or both)

2nd objection Joint action presupposes sophisticated mindreading