talking about and seeing blue

s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk



$\Delta_{(a)}$ vs. $\Delta_{(b)}$



"Redness is visually presented in a way that having inertial mass and being fragile, for instance, are not."

That "'red' denotes the property of an object putatively presented in visual experience" is a "subject-determining platitude"

(Jackson 1996: 199-200).





$\Delta_{(a)}$ vs. $\Delta_{(b)}$

the feeling of familiarty

(b’)

ATFGZ ATRGZ ALRGZ

(a’)

$\Delta_{(a')}$ vs $\Delta_{(b')}$

modified from http://www.columbia.edu/itc/psychology/rmk/T2/T2.2b.html

(b’)

ATFGZ ATRGZ ALRGZ

(a’)

$\Delta_{(a')}$ vs $\Delta_{(b')}$

modified from http://www.columbia.edu/itc/psychology/rmk/T2/T2.2b.html

“there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”

(Byrne 2001: 204)

a ‘subject can only discover the phenomenal character of her experience by attending to the world ... as her experience represents it’

(p. 211)

“there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”

(Byrne 2001: 204)

(b’)

ATFGZ ATRGZ ALRGZ

(a’)

- ~~perceptual experience of the familiarity of the stimulus~~
- ~~perceptual experience of a bodily change~~
- cognitive experience
- bare sensation

(b’)

ATFGZ ATRGZ ALRGZ

(a’)

$\Delta_{(a')}$ vs $\Delta_{(b')}$

modified from http://www.columbia.edu/itc/psychology/rmk/T2/T2.2b.html



$\Delta_{(a)}$ vs. $\Delta_{(b)}$

bare sensation

bare sensation

- monadic properties of events
- individuated by their normal causes

bare sensation

- monadic properties of events
- individuated by their normal causes

bare sensation

- monadic properties of events
  - perceptual experiences
  - alter phenomenal character
  - not determined by any intentional properties
- individuated by their normal causes

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

$\Delta_{(a)}$ vs. $\Delta_{(b)}$

categorical perception

categorical perception

"The colours to which human languages give names are experienced […] as sharply different from one another"

Matthen (2005b:190)

categorical perception ? ?

"The colours to which human languages give names are experienced […] as sharply different from one another"

Matthen (2005b:190)



Source modified from Daoutis, Pilling & Davies. 2006. Categorical effects in visual search for colour. Fig A1



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

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TARGET









Source redrawn from part of Pilling, M et al (2003), "Is color "categorical perception" really perceptual?" Memory & Cognition, 31:538-551, p.543 fig 1A











Source modified from Daoutis, Pilling & Davies. 2006. Categorical effects in visual search for colour. Fig 2

"The *category question* concerns whether observers perceive qualitative similarities … Discriminable wavelengths seem to be categorized together because they appear perceptually similar."

Bornstein (1987: 288-9)

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

(Press the spacebar when you see this)

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010



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

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

oddball

vMMN (visual mismatch negativity): an event-related potential thought to index pre-attentive change detection in the visual cortex



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

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

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

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

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
phenomenological character
heightened discrimination
pop-out
pre-attentive visual change detection
verbal labelling
…


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…
explained in part by
a perceptual process
which categorises

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colour terms

"surprising it would be indeed if I have a perceptual experience as of red *because* I call the perceived object red."

(Stokes 2006: 324-5)

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- culture
- training color terms (2 days)
- verbal interference
- right visual field (RVF) only
- training affects RVF only
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development

“[j]ustified belief … is available simply on the basis of visual perception”

(Johnston 1992: 222)

Phenomenal character “stands ready … to make a direct impact on beliefs”

(Tye 1995: 143–4)

“[p]erceptual experiences are … intrinsically … belief-inducing”

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1. S can and does perceptually experience *blue* and *green*

2. S can acquire beliefs involving BLUE

3. S cannot acquire beliefs involving GREEN



"Which one of these is like the toy I just put away?"

Source Kowalski and Zimiles (2006) The relation between children's conceptual functioning with colour and colour term acquisition



"Which one of these is like the toy I just put away?"

	Color abstraction score	
	0–2	3–5
0 color terms	17 (100)	0 (0)
1–4 color terms	15 (75)	5 (25)
5–6 color terms	4 (18)	18 (82)

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









Source Franklin et al 2005

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

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010


550
560
570
580



Source Bornstein et al. 1976. Color vision and hue categorization in young human infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. Vol. 2(1) 2, no. 1 (February): 115-129.



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

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

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

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

$\Delta_{(a)}$ vs. $\Delta_{(b)}$

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
(b)
2.5B
7.5BG
2.5BG
(a)

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