# 5. Actions, Intentions & Goals

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Onishi & Baillargeon (2005)













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Its function ... is to generate new descriptions of actions in terms of their reasons;

thus 'James went to church with the intention of pleasing his mother' yields a new, and fuller, description of the action described in 'James went to church'.

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(Davidson 1963: 690)

Desire: to please my mother Belief: I can please my mother by going to church. Action: Go to church.











Desire: to nurture squirrels Belief: I can nurture squirrels by building a squirrel house. Action: I build a squirrel

house.



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P2. I can nurture squirrels by building a squirrel house.

C. My building a squirrel house would be desirable.



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desire: to earn more money belief: I can earn more money by getting a new job. judgement: My getting a new job would be desirable. desire: to take it easy today belief: I can take it easy today by not getting a new job today.

judgement: My not getting a new job today would be desirable. desire: to earn more money belief: I can earn more money by getting a new job. judgement: My getting a new job would be desirable.

intention:That I get a new job.

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#### intention

- ≠ goal
- ≠ action-causing belief—desire pair
- ≠ judgment that it would be desirable

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So what are intentions?

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## judgement: My getting a new job would be desirable.

#### today.

judgement: My not getting a new job today would be desirable.

#### agglomeration

intention: That I get a new job.

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What are intentions for?



(Zhang and Rosenbaum 2007)

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### intention:That I get a new

intention: That I do not get a

'why should rational agents like us have the capacity to have both

ordinary intentions (subject to demands for consistency and agglomeration)

and

guiding desires (which are not subject to these demands)?'

(Bratman 1987, pp. 137–8)





"chimpanzees understand ... intentions ... perception and knowledge ... Moreover, they understand how these psychological states work together to produce intentional action" (Call & Tomasello 2008:191)





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same outcome Cattaneo et al (2010) Some motor representations carry information about outcomes.



#### same outcome Cattaneo et al (2010)

Villiger et al (2010)















1s

2s

2s


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1s

2s

25











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## motor representation = intention ?

### motor representation = intention ? No !

### < different content >





< different content >

Head down Rue Cujas toward Rue Victor Cousin. Turn right onto Rue Saint-Jacques....



Take RER B and get out at the Luxembourg station, from there it's less than 5 minutes walk.



Head down Rue Cujas toward Rue Victor Cousin. Turn right onto Rue Saint-Jacques....





Head down Rue Cujas toward Rue Victor Cousin. Turn right onto Rue Saint-Jacques....

Λ

different format

V

e.g. rapid identification of key landmarks; slow translation into compass directions

Rapid identification of direction of start from end (projectiondependent)



# imagine

seeing



















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iii. differ in format from intentions.

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Head southeast on Rue Cujas toward Rue Victor Cousin. Turn right onto Rue Saint-Jacques....





# Follow that route



?







