Which Joint Actions Ground Social Cognition? s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk

Challenge Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of

social cognition.

Representing perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs is hard, for it requires

Representing perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs is hard, for it requires

(a) conceptual sophistication

- takes years to develop

 development tied to acquisition of executive function and language

- development facilitated by training and siblings

(b) scarce cognitive

- resources
- attention
- working memory

Representing perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs is hard, for it requires

(a) conceptual sophistication

- takes years to develop
- development tied to
 acquisition of executive
 function and language

 development facilitated by training and siblings

- (b) scarce cognitive resources
- attention
- working memory

Representing perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs is hard, for it requires

(a) conceptual sophistication

- takes years to develop
- development tied to
 acquisition of executive
 function and language
- development facilitated by training and siblings

- (b) scarce cognitive resources
- attention
- working memory

Explai develo_l social co

> "the unique aspects of human cognition ... were driven by, or even constituted by, social co-operation" (Moll & Tomasello 2007)

ns of

"perception, action, and cognition are grounded in social interaction" (Sebanz & Knoblich 2008)

Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of

social cognition.

Som jecture The existence of abilities to engage in joint

action partially explains how sophisticated forms of social cognition emerge in evolution or development (or both)

Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of

social cognition.

Conjecture The existence of abilities to engage in joint action partially explains how sophisticated forms of social cognition emerge in evolution

or development (or both)

Challenge Explain the emergence, in evolution or

development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition.

The existence of abilities to engage in joint action partially explains how sophisticated forms of social cognition emerge in evolution or development (or both)

OUDESTION Given the conjecture, what could joint action be?

tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005) cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007) pretending to row a boat together

painting a house together (Bratman 1992) lifting a heavy sofa together (Velleman 1997) preparing a hollandaise sauce together (Searle 1990) going to Chicago together (Kutz 2000) walking together (Gilbert 1990)

tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005) cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007) pretending to row a boat together

shared intention

'I take a collective action to involve a collective [shared] intention.'

(Gilbert 2006, p. 5)

'I take a collective action to involve a collective [shared] intention.'

(Gilbert 2006, p. 5)

'The sine qua non of collaborative action is a joint goal [shared intention] and a joint commitment' (Tomasello 2008, p. 181)

'I take a collective action to involve a collective [shared] intention.'

(Gilbert 2006, p. 5)

'The sine qua non of collaborative action is a joint goal [shared intention] and a joint commitment' (Tomasello 2008, p. 181)

'the key property of joint action lies in its internal component [...] in the participants' having a "collective" or "shared" intention.'

(Alonso 2009, pp. 444-5)

'Shared intentionality is the foundation upon which joint action is built.'

(Carpenter 2009, p. 381)



Functional characterisation

Substantial account



Functional characterisation

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining Substantial account



Functional characterisation

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining



Substantial account

We have a shared intention that we J if

"1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

"2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of Ia, Ib, and meshing subplans of Ia and Ib; you intend [likewise] ...

"3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us" (Bratman 1993:View 4)

Functional characterisation

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining

Intentions about intentions

Substantial account

We have a shared intention that we J if

"1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

"2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of Ia, Ib, and meshing subplans of Ia and Ib; you intend [likewise] ...

"3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us" (Bratman 1993:View 4)

Functional characterisation

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining

Intentions about intentions

Knowledge of others' knowledge of intentions about intentions

Substantial account

We have a shared intention that we J if

"1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

"2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of Ia, Ib, and meshing subplans of Ia and Ib; you intend [likewise] ...

"3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us"

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

Functional characterisation

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining

Intentions about intentions

Knowledge of others' knowledge of intentions about intentions

Substantial account

We have a shared intention that we J if

"1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

"2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of Ia, Ib, and meshing subplans of Ia and Ib; you intend [likewise] ...

"3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us"

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

Functional characterisation

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining



Substantial account

We have a shared intention that we J if

"1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

"2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of Ia, Ib, and meshing subplans of Ia and Ib; you intend [likewise] ...

"3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us" (Bratman 1993:View 4)

Functional characterisation

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining

'shared intentional agency consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning agency of the participants.'

(Bratman 2011, p. 11)

Substantial account

We have a shared intention that we J if

"1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

"2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of Ia, Ib, and meshing subplans of Ia and Ib; you intend [likewise] ...

"3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us" (Bratman 1993:View 4) 1. All (significant) joint actions require shared intention.

2. Shared intention requires sophisticated theory of mind cognition.

Therefore:

3. Abilities to engage in joint action could play no significant role in explaining how sophisticated theory of mind cognition emerges. 1. All (significant) joint actions require shared intention.

2. Shared intention requires sophisticated theory of mind cognition.

Therefore:

3. Abilities to engage in joint action could play no significant role in explaining how sophisticated theory of mind cognition emerges.

(not why)

1. All (significant) joint actions require emergence, in evolution or

shared intention. social cognition.

2. Shared intention requires sophisticated theory of mind cognition.

Therefore:

3. Abilities to engage in joint action could play no significant role in explaining how sophisticated theory of mind cognition emerges.

Given the conjecture, what could joint action be?

ne existence of abilities to engage in joint

1. All (significant) joint actions require shared intention.

2. Shared intention requires sophisticated theory of mind cognition.

Therefore:

3. Abilities to engage in joint action could play no significant role in explaining how sophisticated theory of mind cognition emerges.

1. All (significant) joint actions require shared intention.

2. Shared intention requires sophisticated theory of mind cognition.

Therefore:

3. Abilities to engage in joint action could play no significant role in explaining how sophisticated theory of mind cognition emerges.

'our primitive actions, the ones we do not by doing something else, ... these are all the actions there are.' (Davidson 1971, p. 59).

'our primitive actions, the ones we do not by doing something else, ... these are all the actions there are.' (Davidson 1971, p. 59).


'our primitive actions, the ones we do not by doing something else, ... these are all the actions there are.' (Davidson 1971, p. 59).



'our primitive actions, the ones we do not by doing something else, ... these are all the actions there are.' (Davidson 1971, p. 59).



'our primitive actions, the ones we do not by doing something else, ... these are all the actions there are.' (Davidson 1971, p. 59). tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005)

cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006)

bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together

(Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together









tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005)

cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006)

bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together

(Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together

¹ Joint action:

an action with two or more agents (Ludwig 2007)

²Bodily movements 'are all the actions there are' (Davidson 1971, p. 59)

³In supposedly paradigm cases of joint action, there are no bodily movements with more than one agent.

Therefore:

⁴Supposedly paradigm cases are not joint actions.

tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005) cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing

(Brownell et al 2006)

bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together

(Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together

¹ Joint action:

an action with two or more agents (Ludwig 2007)

²Bodily movements 'are all the actions there are' (Davidson 1971, p. 59)

³In supposedly paradigm cases of joint action, there are no bodily movements with more than one agent.

Therefore:

⁴Supposedly paradigm cases are not joint actions.

too o the toys together narro (Behne et al 2005) W atively pulling nandles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007) pretending to row a boat together

¹ Joint action:

an action with two or more agents (Ludwig 2007)

²Bodily movements 'are all the actions there are' (Davidson 1971, p. 59)

³In supposedly paradigm cases of joint action, there are no bodily movements with more than one agent.

Therefore:

⁴Supposedly paradigm cases are not joint actions.

100 o the toys together narro (Behne et al 2005) W atively pulling nandles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007) pretending to row a boat together

1 Joint action:

an action with two or more

agents (Ludwig 2007)

2 Bodily movements 'are all the actions there are' (Davidson 1971, p. 59)

³In supposedly paradigm cases of joint action, there are no bodily movements with more than one agent.

Therefore:

⁴Supposedly paradigm cases are not joint actions.

 up the toys together (Behne et al 2005)
eratively pulling nandles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006)

bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together

²Bodily movements 'are all the actions there are' (Davidson 1971, p. 59)

In supposedly paradigm cases of joint action, there are no bodily movements with more than one agent.

Therefore:

⁴Supposedly paradigm cases are not joint actions.

too o the toys together narro (Behne et al 2005) W atively pulling nangles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007) pretending to row a boat together

Grounding

events D₁,... D_n ground E, if:

D₁,...D_n and E occur;

 $D_1, ..., D_n$ are each (perhaps improper) parts of E; and every event that is a proper part of E but does not overlap $D_1, ..., D_n$ is caused by some or all of $D_1, ..., D_n$.

Agency

For an individual to be among the agents of an event is for there to be actions $a_1, \dots a_n$ which ground this event where the individual is an agent of one or more of these actions.

(Adapted from Pietroski 1998)



tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005)

cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006)

bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together



tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005)

cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006)

bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together



too broad up the toys together (Behne et al 2005) eratively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together

pretending to row a boat together

Fred's killing



tidying up the toys together (Behne et al 2005) cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006) bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together

Fred's killing



cooperatively pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell et al 2006)

bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007)

pretending to row a boat together

Fred's killing











Detour Goals are not intentions

What is the relation between an action and the goal (or goals) to which it is directed?





What is the relation between an action and the goal (or goals) to which it is directed?





What is the relation between an action and the goal (or goals) to which it is directed?









End Detour



<u>G is a distributive goal</u>: it is an outcome to which each agent's activities are individually directed and it is possible that: all agents succeed relative to this outcome.

<u>G is a distributive goal</u>: it is an outcome to which each agent's activities are individually directed and it is possible that: all agents succeed relative to this outcome.

G is a collective goal

(a) it is a distributive goal;

(b) the agents' activities are coordinated; and

(c) coordination of this type would normally facilitate occurrences of outcomes of this type.

<u>G is a distributive goal</u>: it is an outcome to which each agent's activities are individually directed and it is possible that: all agents succeed relative to this outcome.

G is a collective goal

(a) it is a distributive goal;

(b) the agents' activities are coordinated; and

(c) coordination of this type would normally facilitate occurrences of outcomes of this type.







<u>G is a distributive goal</u>: it is an outcome to which each agent's activities are individually directed and it is possible that: all agents succeed relative to this outcome.

G is a collective goal

(a) it is a distributive goal;

(b) the agents' activities are coordinated; and

(c) coordination of this type would normally facilitate occurrences of outcomes of this type.

<u>G is a distributive goal</u>: it is an outcome to which each agent's activities are individually directed and it is possible that: all agents succeed relative to this outcome.



Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition.

CONTRACTOR OF ADDALES AND ADD

or development (or both)

OUDESTION Given the conjecture, what could joint action be?

<u>G is a distributive goal</u>: it is an outcome to which each agent's activities are individually directed and it is possible that: all agents succeed relative to this outcome.



